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INTRODUCTION
Four times during the 1985 term the Supreme Court used the equal pro-
tection clause' to invalidate, or permit a challenge to, state and local reg-
ulations, despite the absence of a suspect classification or fundamental right
requiring heightened or strict scrutiny.2 Under the guise of the rational basis
test, the Court struck down a Texas city council decision preventing a group
home for the mentally retarded,3 an Alabama tax burdening foreign insurance
companies, 4 and a New Mexico property tax exemption that applied only to
Vietnam veterans who were New Mexico residents before a cut-off date.5
The Court also reinstated an equal protection challenge to a Vermont use
tax on automobiles purchased outside the state that burdened those who
were non-residents at the time of purchase.6 The Court found the Vermont
statute unconstitutional on its face under rational basis review2
The justices who dissented from these opinions contended that the Court
departed from long-standing equal protection precedents and argued that
these regulations would be valid under the traditional rational basis test., A
finding that these regulations are unconstitutional under rational basis review
implies that the Court used a more searching scrutiny.9 This signals a break
from traditional equal protection analysis in which the Court applies only
the most deferential standard of review when a party brings an equal pro-
tection challenge against economic or social legislation that neither implicates
a suspect classification nor a fundamental right.'0 Many commentators have
suggested that these opinions represent an effort by the Court to put more
1. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment states that "no state shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
2. This Note discusses the different forms of scrutiny employed in traditional equal pro-
tection analysis. See infra Part I.
3. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
4. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985).
5. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985).
6. Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985).
7. Williams, 105 S. Ct. at 2472, 2475.
8. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
Hooper, 105 S. Ct. at 2870-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Williams, 105 S. Ct. at 2477 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1684 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9. This Note discusses the differences between the rational basis test applied in these cases
and the traditional rational basis test. See infra Part II. I shall refer to this more searching
use of rational basis as "rational basis with bite." See infra note 11.
10. See infra Part L
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"teeth" in the rational basis test," and they explain the expansion of the
equal protection clause as an effort to "reach perceived injustices that
otherwise lie beyond constitutional reach.' 2 Others suggest, however, that
these opinions simply represent a less-than-candid use of intermediate scru-
tiny.13 If these cases do in fact represent a trend in equal protection analysis,
this trend may have substantial implications for lower court judges who
must decide which standard of review to employ, and for legislators who
must contend with the enlarged parameters of judicial review.
This Note examines whether the Supreme Court has begun to employ a
more searching type of scrutiny under rational basis review, and argues that
heightened scrutiny under the label of rational basis review is undesirable.
Part I outlines the evolution of traditional equal protection analysis, including
the emergence of "rational basis with bite" in the right-to-travel context.
Part II argues that the Court did employ a more exacting scrutiny than the
traditional rational basis test in the four 1985-term cases. Finally, Part III
concludes that rational basis with bite is simply intermediate scrutiny without
an articulation of the factors that triggered it, and argues that such a use
of intermediate scrutiny is indefensible because it obscures the triggering
mechanism for heightened scrutiny, confusing legislatures and lower courts
and leaving courts unaccountable for their decisions and free to engraft their
own values onto the equal protection clause.
I. Tum EVOLUTION OF EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Today scholars understand the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to require that the government treat all persons similarly situated
in a similar manner. 4 During the first eighty years after its enactment,
however, the Supreme Court believed that the fourteenth amendment pro-
tected only racial and ethnic'5 minorities from discrimination through overt
11. Victor Rosenblum of Northwestern University Law School calls it "rational basis with
teeth," and comments: "We've gotten used to the idea that if the test is rational basis, the
legislation gets an automatic pass. Now rational basis is beginning to mean something." Quoted
in Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, 71 A.B.A. J. 108, 112-14 (1985).
A recent article in the Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter suggests that "the
language of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions leaves room for cautious optimism
that one can argue reasonably that the Court has heightened equal protection for every class
of persons . . ." and also suggests that the Court "went considerably further than past cases
in its application of the rational relationship test to social and economic legislation." Summary,
Analysis, and Commentary, 9 MENTAL & PHYsicAL DisAB. L. RPTR. 242 (1985).
12. Stewart, supra note 11, at 112.
13. See, e.g., Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
14. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CA~iF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949).
15. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356(1886).
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or covert 16 classifications which clearly disadvantaged them.17 Because the
Court believed the scope of protection was so narrow, it interpreted the
equal protection clause as scarcely limiting state power. State governments
were essentially free to benefit or burden groups within their borders in any
way they saw fit."' At this time, the equal protection clause hardly protected
anyone: racial and ethnic minorities could rarely get relief from discrimi-
nation with an equal protection challenge, and other groups could never get
relief at all.19
The Court's current equal protection analysis affords much more protec-
tion. This analysis, which includes strict scrutiny, was conceived in the 1940's
and later took shape under the direction of the Warren Court. The primary
source of strict scrutiny review was Justice Stone's famous footnote four2
in the Carolene Products21 case. Justice Stone suggested that the Court use
a "more searching judicial inquiry" to protect groups that do not have the
ordinary protection of democratic rule because they are unable to participate
effectively in the political process. 22 For the Warren Court, Justice Stone's
thinking in footnote four justified special protection for those groups who
consistently lost in the democratic process. 23
To protect these groups, the Warren Court developed the "suspect clas-
sification" doctrine. In Korematsu v. United States,2A the Court first held
that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect"' and that "courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny." 26 The suspect classification doctrine therefore presumes
a law unconstitutional if it uses certain classifying traits. 27 In order to survive
strict scrutiny, the suspect classification must be "necessary to the
accomplishment" 28 of a "compelling state interest." 29 The Supreme Court
16. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356.
17. The use of overt racial classifications was permissible, absent a showing of unequal
treatment. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (upholding "separate but equal"
railroad car accommodations for blacks and whites).
18. Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" Equal Protection Decisions: Five Im-
perfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINcS CONST. L.Q. 777, 780 (1981).
19. Even though the Court noted that the fourteenth amendment contained no language
limiting its scope of protection to discrimination, the Court saw racial discrimination as the
primary evil the fourteenth amendment was created to eliminate. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
36, 71-72 (1873). See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HAtv. L. Ray. 1, 59-63 (1955).
20. Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 CoLum. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (1982).
21. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
22. Id. at 152 n. 4.
23. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713, 713 (1985).
24. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
25. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 14, at 356.
28. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
29. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
19871
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to date recognizes two suspect classifications that trigger strict scrutiny: race
or national origin0 and alienage. 1l
The Court soon added the "fundamental rights" doctrine which expanded
the clause to protect other groups, including those who were not necessarily
consistent losers in the political process. Skinner v. Oklahoma32 marked the
beginning of this doctrine, which commands that classifications infringing
upon fundamental interests also be subject to strict scrutiny. 33 In Skinner,
the Warren Court struck down a statute requiring sterilization of habitual
criminals because it found that "marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race. ' 34 In order to survive strict
scrutiny, a classification that burdens the exercise of a fundamental right
must be "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest."' 31 The
list of fundamental rights today includes the rights of interstate travel,36
equal access to voting and the ballot,37 and equal access to the judiciary.38
Under the suspect classification and fundamental interest doctrines, the
Warren Court still permitted the state whose legislation was under attack to
show that the classification was necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest. But, as Professor Gunther noted, "scrutiny that was 'strict' in
theory was fatal in fact."'39 Even today, when the Court finds that a statute
30. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214(1944). Strict scrutiny, however, may not apply to compensatory racial classifications. See, e.g.,
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978).
31. See, e.g., Sugarman v. DougaIl, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971). Strict scrutiny is applied to state, but not federal, laws containing alienage classi-
fications. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). Moreover, even in cases involving
state laws only, an alienage classification can receive rational basis review instead of strict
scrutiny if the purpose of the regulation goes to the heart of self-government and does not
foster economic parochialism. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
32. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
33. Blattner, supra note 18, at 782.
34. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added).
35. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis in original).
36. See, e.g., id.
37. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (unconstitutional to require
independents to file earlier than regular political parties); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating statute that one must own or lease property in district
or have children in school to vote in district election); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state poll tax violated the equal protection clause).
38. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring that indigent deiendents
be provided counsel for appeals as of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (held state
must provide free trial transcript to indigents).
39. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and
the Promotion of Human Rights: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 15 Hnv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1972).
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implicates a suspect class or burdens a fundamental right, the Court will
almost always find the legislation unconstitutional. 40
Outside the areas of suspect classifications or fundamental rights, the
Supreme Court continued to apply a minimal scrutiny standard 4' -or the
traditional rational basis test. The rational basis test generally presumes that
legislation is constitutional, and the Court will uphold the law if the clas-
sification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. 42 Under this standard of review, the Court defers to legislative
judgment if at all possible,43 requiring only that some plausible set of facts
exists that allows the Court to justify the challenged statute. 44 The Court
condones "under-inclusiveness, ' 45 stating that a legislature may achieve its
goals "one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative mind." 46 The Court also condones
"over-inclusiveness, '47 stating that "rational distinctions may be made with
substantially less than mathematical exactitude." 4 When the state fails to
present a sufficient factual basis to justify a statute, the Court supplies its
own justification, even when the statute is both under- and over-inclusive.49
Often the Court recharacterizes the purpose of the statute0 so that it may
render the classification "rational" in deference to the fact-finding ability
of state legislatures. Although the Warren Court required the state to supply
a factual basis rationally relating the statute to a legitimate state goal, scrutiny
that was minimal in theory was virtually nonexistent. 51 Until recently, when
40. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448; Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
41. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age not a
suspect classification, therefore rational basis test applied); Blattner, supra note 18, at 783.
42. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd.
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980); VanEe v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
43. During the Warren Era, the Court found only one statute unconstitutional under the
rational basis test. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled, New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976).
44. Blattner, supra note 18, at 783; see supra notes 38-42.
45. An under-inclusive classification is one in which "[a]ll who are included in the class
are tainted with the mischief, but there are others also tainted whom the classification does
not include; [that is,] the classification does not include all who are similarly situated." Tussman
& tenBroek, supra note 14, at 348.
46. An over-inclusive classification is one which "imposes a burden upon a wider range of
individuals than are included in the class of those tainted with the mischief at which the law
aims." Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 14, at 351.
47. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
48. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
49. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (legislative classification
both over-and-under-inclusive, yet the Supreme Court does not invalidate economic legislation
simply because "inartfully" drawn). See also Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303 (the Supreme Court
upholds under-and-over-inclusive legislative classification).
50. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (Court upholds
statute by condoning under-inclusive means and re-characterizing purpose from eliminating
advertising to limiting advertising).
51. Gunther, supra note 39, at 8.
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the Court applied the rational basis test, it almost always upheld the statute.2
Because the level of scrutiny employed determined the outcome of the chal-
lenge, equal protection analysis for the Warren Court consisted primarily
of choosing between strict scrutiny or rational basis review.5 3
With the development of intermediate scrutiny, the Burger Court further
expanded the reach of the equal protection clause. Increasing dissatisfaction
with the two-tiered equal protection system of strict scrutiny and the rational
basis test54 prompted the Court to add this third standard of review. Com-
mentators cite three major factors as impetus for this change. First, many
scholars severely criticized the fundamental rights doctrine. Second, rising
public awareness of discrimination against groups other than racial groups
had increased demands for judicial protection. Third, the advent of legal
aid for the disadvantaged influenced the development of creative judicial
intervention on behalf of indigents. 5 The Court developed intermediate
scrutiny to protect other groups that, like racial minorities, lack power in
the political process. For example, the Court primarily uses this scrutiny to
review statutes involving the quasi-suspect classifications of gender 6 and
illegitimacy. 57 Groups within these classifications, like racial minorities, are
also disadvantaged by legislation classifying them on the basis of an "im-
mutable characteristic." Unlike the legislative classification of racial minor-
ities, however, the legislative classification of these quasi-suspect classes is
occasionally relevant to a legitimate state goal.58
Under this standard of review, classifications must be "substantially re-
lated" to the achievement of "important governmental objectives." 9 This
medium level scrutiny permits the Court to look more closely at the ends
and means of the challenged statute, instead of merely pronouncing it valid
or invalid under traditional analysisA" The Court does not accept every goal
52. But see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (statute classification
found totally arbitrary and invalidated under rational basis test).
53. Blattner, supra note 18, at 784.
54. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Blattner, supra note 18, at 784-85.
56. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450
U.S. 464 (1981); Craig, 429 U.S. 190.
57. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
58. The indicia for a suspect class are (1) an immutable characteristic (2) which is irrelevant
to a legitimate legislative generalization (3) used to disadvantage a politically powerless group.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Court protects women and illegitimate
children with a lower level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny for the following reasons: (1) women,
though under-represented in political office, are not as politically powerless as racial minorities
because they comprise fifty percent of the voting population; (2) illegitimate children do not
remain politically-powerless bedause they grow into voting adults; (3) a gender classification is
sometimes relevant because women are unable to perform some tasks that men perform, such
as combat; and (4) an illegitimacy classification is sometimes relevant because it serves as a
proxy in situations requiring proof of paternity.
59. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
60. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16.
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proffered by the state,61 and if an alternative means exists which does not
disadvantage the protected group, the Court can prompt the legislature to
employ the alternative means by invalidating the legislation.62
In 1982, the Supreme Court, in its opinion in Plyler v. Doe, extended
intermediate scrutiny protection beyond these quasi-suspect classes. 63 In this
case, the Court struck down a law that denied illegal-alien children access
to free education. Three important considerations justified the decision. First,
because the children were politically powerless and unable to alter the clas-
sifying characteristic of "illegal-alien," they deserved some protection as at
least approaching a quasi-suspect class.A4 Second, because the right to ed-
ucation, though not fundamental, 65 is extremely important, it deserved some
protection as a quasi-fundamental right. 66 Third, the statute completely de-
nied children access to free education. 67 Invoking intermediate scrutiny en-
abled the Court to consider these three factors and tailor justice to the
situation. 6 The Court, however, did not decide whether this expansion should
be limited to the unique circumstances of Plyler or whether other quasi-
fundamental rights or groups approaching quasi-suspect status existed else-
where, deserving the added protection of heightened scrutiny.69
The Burger Court added yet another twist to equal protection analysis in
Zobel v. Williams,70 a case which appeared to employ a rational basis test
with bite. In Zobel, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Alaskan
law that pro-rated benefits from state oil revenues among residents according
to the length of time they had lived in the state. 71 Since 1969, the Court
had closely scrutinized statutes that awarded benefits on the basis of du-
rational residency requirements to determine whether they burdened the
fundamental right-to-travel. 72 The majority opinion in Zobel, however, by-
61. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (administrative
convenience is not an important governmental objective); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455
(1981) (same).
62. See, e.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. 464.
63. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). "Quasi-suspect" is the term used to refer to classifications that,
in themselves and without more, trigger intermediate scrutiny.
64. Id. at 219-20.
65. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), reh'g denied, 411
U.S. 959 (1973).
66. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-23.
67. Id. at 226.
68. As Chief Justice Burger stated in his dissent, "by patching together bits and pieces of
what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the court spins
out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases." Id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
69. See Note, Constitutional Law-The Equal Protection Clause-The Effect of Plyler v.
Doe on Intermediate Scrutiny, 36 OKIA. L. Rav. 321 (1983).
70. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
71. Id. at 56.
72. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
1987]
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passed the right-to-travel issue, 7 focusing instead on the unequal distribution
of benefits between citizens. 74 The Court found the Zobel statute violated
the equal protection clause because it created "fixed, permanent distinctions
between . .. classes of concededly bona fide residents." 75
The Court did not state whether right-to-travel cases still required height-
ened scrutiny. Instead, it claimed that it did not need to determine a standard
of review for this statute because the statute could not "pass even the minimal
test."' 76 The ensuing review, however, appeared to be more exacting than
the traditional rational basis test. First, the Court found the scheme not
rationally related to Alaska's purposes of (1) creating a financial incentive
to establish and maintain residence in Alaska and (2) encouraging prudent
management of the fund. 77 One can argue, however, that the statute was
rationally related to these purposes because a scheme which distributes ben-
efits to residents quite plausibly might retain residents and promote migration
to the state.78 Moreover, the distinction between long-term and short-term
residents might have been a political compromise to avoid immediate payment
of all revenues to current residents. If so, the distinction enabled prudent
management of the fund.
Second, the Court found Alaska's purpose of rewarding citizens for past
contributions to be illegitimate.7 9 But one can argue, as Justice O'Connor
does in her concurrence, that compensating citizens for prior contributions
is a legitimate purpose because it is "neither inherently invidious nor irra-
tional."8 0 Justice O'Connor contended that awarding benefits on the basis
of durational residency requirements fails only if the Court views it in a
right-to-travel context which requires strict scrutiny. Otherwise, under tra-
ditional rational basis review, this purpose must surely pass muster.81
Under the traditional rational basis test, the Court would not invalidate
an economic statutory scheme, like the one in Zobel, unless it was completely
73. Chief Justice Burger distinguishes Zobel from other cases involving "durationa residency
requirements," saying those cases involved a waiting period for the purpose of determining
actual residency before distributing benefits, while the Zobel statute did not involve a waiting
period. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 58. Yet Justice O'Connor argues quite reasonably in her concurrence
that the Court's holding depends on the right-to-travel issue. Id. at 71-81 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
74. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59-60. Under the challenged statute, the legislature paid every citizen
over the age of eighteen fifty dollars ($50.00) for each year he had lived in Alaska since it
became a state in 1959. For example, a citizen since 1959 received $1050 while one who had
lived there only a year received $50. As a result, newer residents and younger residents received
fewer benefits. Id. at 57.
75. Id. at 59.
76. Id. at 60-61.
77. Id. at 61-63.
78. Id. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 63-64.
80. Id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 72-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor relied on the privileges and
immunities clause, not the equal protection clause, to decide this case.
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arbitrary, and the Court would more than likely supply its own purpose to
justify the statute.12 Because the Court did not defer to the Alaskan legislature
in this way, 3 it appears to have applied a more exacting review than tra-
ditional rational basis; that is, rational basis with bite. Until the 1985 term,
however, Zobel was a deviant case: perhaps indicating the Court's intention
to ground its decisions for cases involving durational residency requirements
in the equal protection clause without regard to the right-to-travel,8 and
perhaps advocating the use of rational basis with bite in the fight-to-travel
context. And, until the 1985 term, even with the exception of its decision
in Zobel, the Supreme Court appeared to have settled on three levels of
scrutiny in equal protection analysis.
II. A GRoWING JURISPRUDENCE OF RATIONAL BASIS WnTH BITE?
A. Zobel v. Williams Reaffirmed: Rational Basis with Bite in the
Right-To-Travel Context
Twice during the 1985 term, the Supreme Court avoided using the strict
scrutiny traditionally required in the right-to-travel context and instead em-
ployed rational basis with bite. The Court reviewed two cases that, like
Zobel, involved statutory schemes that used durational residency require-
ments to create distinctions between bona fide residents, and therefore pos-
sibly penalized interstate migration. In the first case, Williams v. Vermont,
the Court relied upon Zobel to reinstate an equal protection challenge to a
residency-based statute. The Court held that, facially, this statute could not
survive rational basis review. In the second case, Hooper v. Bernalillo County
Assessor, the Court explicitly reaffirmed Zobel and struck down the chal-
lenged statute with review that was hardly deferential to the legislature. In
both cases, the Court purported to ignore the right-to-travel issue. These
decisions, coupled with Zobel itself, suggest a growing jurisprudence of
rational basis with bite in the right-to-travel context.
1. Williams v. Vermont
In the Williams decision, handed down twenty days before the Hooper
decision, the Court did not explicitly reaffirm Zobel. The Court did, however,
rely on Zobel to find the statute facially unconstitutional, and the parallels
between the two cases are obvious. In Williams, the Court reinstated an
82. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text; Zobel, 457 U.S. at 82-83 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
83. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 84.
84. Note, Constitutional Law-Right to Travel-Equal Protection-Durational Residency
Requirements, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 829, 849 (1985).
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equal protection challenge to a Vermont tax scheme. Tlus statute gave
Vermont residents a credit against an automobile use tax for taxes paid to
other states when an automobile was purchased out-of-state. This credit,
however, was only available if the puchaser was a Vermont resident at the
time the tax was paid to the other state.8 5 The appellants had purchased and
registered cars outside of Vermont before becoming Vermont residents, and
they challenged the requirement that they pay the full use tax in order to
register their cars in Vermont. 6 The appellants argued that a tax incurred
due to change in residency infringed on the right-to-travel by penalizing
interstate migration. 7 Again, as in Zobel, the Court bypassed the nght-to-
travel issue,8 8 focusing instead on the state's unequal treatment of residents.8 9
The Court purported to apply the deferential scrutiny of rational basis
review in Williams because the statute involved a state taxation scheme-an
area in which the Court had "been reluctant to interfere with legislative
policy decisions .. "90 The Court stated that it would uphold the exemption
if the legislature could have "reasonably concluded" that the distinction
between residents would "promote a legitimate state purpose." 91 Even though
the Court articulated the traditional rational basis test, 92 its analysis greatly
resembled heightened scrutiny because it required the legislature to draw a
"more precise and direct classification" 93 in order for the statute to survive
review.94
The Court first found that distinguishing between present Vermont reg-
istrants on the basis of residence at the time of purchase was "wholly
arbitrary" and bore no relation to the relevant statutory purposes. 95 The
Court reasoned that, because all registrants were similarly situated for the
relevant purposes of the statute-such as residency, using a car in Vermont,
and duty to finance Vermont road maintenance-taxing each registrant would
identically serve the statutory purposes. 96 The Court cited Zobel in support
of this notionY7
85. Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465, 2468 (1985).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2469.
88. Unlike Zobel, however, the Court merely argued that, due to its narrow holding m this
case, it need not consider the appellants' arguments based on the fundamental right-to-travel.
Id. at 2474.
89. Id. at 2472-74.
90. Id. at 2472 (citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
93. Williams, 105 S. Ct. at 2472 n.8.
94. The requirement in footnote 8 of a "more precise and direct classification" where one
is "more easily drawn" resembles the use of heightened scrutiny in Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, (1981). See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
95. Williams, 105 S. Ct. at 2472.
96. Id.
97 Id.
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Second, even though the Court conceded that Vermont's policy was le-
gitimate and justified imposing a tax on those in the appellants' position,"
the Court found "no rational reason to spare Vermont residents an equal
burden."? The Court explained that the scheme was not rationally related
to the purpose of raising revenues for road maintenance because the clas-
sification exempted other Vermont residents who use the roads and who,
therefore, should contribute to their maintenance.10 Because the statutory
classification was under-inclusive in this manner, the Court found that the
appellants had a legitimate claim of discrimination and held the statute
unconstitutional on its face.101
Under the traditional rational basis test, in contrast, the Court would
permit the Vermont legislature to "take one step at a time"i 2 in order to
raise revenue for road maintenance; that is, the classification need not contain
all people who could be taxed, so long as it taxed people who used the roads
and this tax raised revenue for road maintenance.10 3 Under the traditional
analysis, the Court might also have supplanted the legislature's "mainte-
nance" justification with one that could pass scrutiny. The dissent in Wil-
liams, in fact, offers two such justifications for exempting those who are
residents at the time they purchase their cars. First, the exemption facilitates
interstate commerce by ensuring that residents and non-residents are not
penalized for purchasing cars outside their state. Second, the exemption
prevents someone who uses the roads primarily in one state from paying
taxes in two states. 104 Therefore, as the dissent argued, residency is not an
irrational classification to employ in achieving these purposes 0 5 -even if
the classification is not precise,"'6 and "the tax exemption would easily pass
the minimal scrutiny ... routinely applie[d] to tax statutes."' °7
In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court must have employed a
higher scrutiny than rational basis.es But the scrutiny employed was not
strict scrutiny either. As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent: "[t]he Court
seems to have adopted a new level of scrutiny that is neither minimal nor
98. Id. at 2473.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2475. Instead of invalidating the statute, however, the Court remanded the case
because it believed that, with other facts, the statute might not operate in a discriminatory
manner. Id. at 2474-75.
102. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
103. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. "A tax classification does not violate
the demands of equal protection simply because it may not perfectly identify the class of people
it wishes to single out." Williams, 105 S. Ct. at 2478 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Williams, 105 S. Ct. at 2475 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2478.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2476.
108. Justice Blackmun calls it a "microscopic scrutiny that few enactments could survive."
Id.
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strict, but strange unto itself;"' 9 a remark suggesting that the Court had
once again employed rational basis with bite. By employing a more probing
form of scrutiny than traditional rational basis on a statute involving a
durational residency requirement and by citing Zobel as precedent, the Wil-
liams case strengthens the idea that the Court intends to employ a rational-
basis-with-bite test in the right-to-travel context.
2. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor
In Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,110 the Court not only cited Zobel
several times throughout its opinion,"' it explicitly reaffirmed Zobel.112 In
Hooper, the Court invalidated a New Mexico statute that provided a limited
property tax exemption to Vietnam veterans who were New Mexico residents
prior to May 8, 1976.113 The appellants, husband and wife, met every eli-
gibility requirement except the cut-off date, because they did not establish
residence in New Mexico until 1981.114 The appellants argued that the statute
violated their right to migrate to New Mexico. 1 5 Again, as in Zobel, the
Court bypassed the right-to-travel issue," 6 focusing instead on New Mexico's
unequal treatment of resident Vietnam veterans. 7 The Court found the New
Mexico statute offensive for the same reason it found the Zobel statute
offensive: it created "fixed, permanent distinctions between . . . classes of
concededly bona fide residents"" 8 based upon how long they lived in the
state." 9
The Court also cited Zobel as support for applying the rational basis test
in the right-to-travel context of Hooper.120 As in Zobel, the Court refused
to consider using heightened scrutiny "if the statutory scheme cannot pass
even the minimum rationality test."' 2' The ensuing review of the statute,
however, like the review in Zobel, appeared to be more exacting than tra-
ditional rational basis review.
109. Id.
110. 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985).
111. Zobel v. Williams is mentioned eight times in the Hooper opinion. Hooper, 105 S. Ct.
at 2866, 2868, 2869.
112. Id. at 2869.
113. Id. at 2865.
114. Id. at 2864.
115. Id. at 2865.
116. As in Zobel, the Court reasoned that the New Mexico statute differed from other
statutes involving durational residency requirements, which it reviewed under the fundamental
rights doctrine, because it did not "impose any threshold waiting period" or "purport to
establish a test of bona fides of state residence." Id.
117. Id. at 2866.
118. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59, quoted in Hooper, 105 S. Ct. at 2866.
119. Hooper, 105 S. Ct. at 2866.
120. Id. at 2866.
121. Id.
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The Court first found that the distinctions in this tax exemption scheme
were not rationally related to New Mexico's purpose of encouraging veterans
to settle in the state.'2 The Court reasoned that the retroactive nature of
the legislation would actually discourage the migration of veterans who Vould
not meet the cut-off date.123 This time, the Court not only cited Zobel in
support of this notion, but even quoted the actual text of the Zobel opimon,
saying "Itihe separation of residents into classes hardly seems a likely way
to persuade new [residents] that the state welcomes them and wants them
to stay. ' 124
The Court next held illegitimate New Mexico's purpose of rewarding
veterans, who resided in the state before the cut-off date, for their military
service. 12 The Court conceded that distinguishing between veterans and other
residents in order to express gratitude for military service was a legitimate
purpose. 126 But the Court did not believe this purpose was New Mexico's
actual purpose. Instead, the Court reasoned that the statute singled out only
previous residents for its benefits by distinguishing between "established"
veterans and veterans who became residents after the cut-off date. Its true
purpose, therefore, was to reward "citizens for their 'past contributions'
toward our nation's military effort in Vietnam."' 127 The Court then cited
Zobel, saying "Zobel teaches that such an objective is 'not a legitimate state
purpose.' "128
Under the traditional rational basis test, the Court would not re-charac-
terize the state's purpose, as it re-characterized New Mexico's purpose in
Hooper, in order to hold the statute unconstitutional.2 9 Instead, like the
dissent in Hooper, 3 0 it would accept the first legitimate purpose offered or,
if no legitimate purpose were offered, it would supplant the state's purpose
with a legitimate one. Then the Court would uphold the statute if it could
have arguably furthered this purpose in any way.' 3' For example, the dissent
in Hooper applied the traditional test. It accepted as legitimate the purpose
of rewarding veterans for past contributions.1 2 It argued that the state was
justified in limiting the benefits to some, but not all, resident veterans because
"the [s]tate's resources [we]re not infinite.' ' 33 Finally, it contended that,
122. Id. at 2866-67.
123. Id. at 2867.
124. Id. (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 62 n.9).
125. Id. at 2869.
126. Id. at 2867.
127. Id. at 2869.
128. Id.
129. Under traditional rational basis review, the Court only re-charactenzes purposes to
uphold a statute. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
130. See Hooper, 105 S. Ct. at 2869-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
132. Hooper, 105 S. Ct. at 2870 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2871.
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even though the cut-off date was not a perfect proxy for identifying Vietnam
veterans seeking to become New Mexico residents, the rational basis test did
not require "mathematical exactitude."'13 4 The dissent's analysis clearly il-
lustrates that the New Mexico statute would have been upheld under tra-
ditional rational basis review.
In light of the Williams and Hooper decisions of the 1985 term, Zobel is
no longer a deviant case. In both opinions, as in Zobel, the Court avoided
the right-to-travel issue. In both opinions, as in Zobel, the Supreme Court
avoided using heightened scrutiny to review statutes involving durational
residence requirements, but employed a more probing scrutiny than tradi-
tional rational basis. In both opinions, the Court cited Zobel as precedent.
In the Hooper opinion, the Court went so far as to explicitly reaffirm Zobel.
Thus, the Court's recent opinions seem to confirm the suggestion in Zobel
that the Court intends to apply rational basis with bite in the right-to-travel
context.
The Court's decision to use a more exacting scrutiny than traditional
rational basis in the right-to-travel context has merit. Cases like Williams
and Hooper, in which the state rewards its residents on the basis of how
long they have lived within its boundaries, contain the two elements that
often trigger heightened scrutiny: a politically-disadvantaged group and an
important right. First, new residents are arguably disadvantaged by the
political process. It is true that residents as a class are not under-represented
in political office, nor do they have a history of discrimination against them.
It is also true that all residents over eighteen years of age can vote and are
therefore able to influence the political system for protection. But newly-
arrived residents might not have had any political power at all at the time
the discriminatory legislation was enacted because they might not yet have
moved to the state. Therefore, newly-arrived residents might need the special
protection of heightened scrutiny in some cases. Second, the right to interstate
migration is extremely important-too important to justify complete deferral
to state legislatures. The framers implied by creating a national government
that they created a national country, and such a country would not be
possible'if people are unable to move freely from state to state. Therefore,
the Court is justified in looking more closely at legislation that arguably
might penalize interstate migration. Because the legislation in the right-to-
travel context affects both a group at least approaching quasi-suspect status
and an important right, the Court is justified in employing something more
probing than traditional rational basis review.
134. Id.
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B. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center: Rational Basis
with Bite in a "Plyler" Context
The Supreme Court further surprised scholars when it invalidated a piece
of legislation under the rational basis test in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center. 3 5 In Zobel, the Court had in no way indicated that rational
basis with bite was appropriate for any cases other than those involving
durational residency requirements. In fact, based on precedent, the Court
should have chosen the intermediate scrutiny of Plyler v. Doe because Cle-
burne had the necessary ingredients of a quasi-fundamental right and a
classification approaching quasi-suspect status: the challenged statute class-
ified on the basis of the immutable characteristic of mental retardation,
burdened a politically-powerless group, and burdened the right of the men-
tally retarded to live in a group home. 136 The Court, however, chose to
bypass this opportunity to recognize another quasi-suspect classification or
quasi-fundamental right deserving the protection of intermediate scrutiny.
Instead the Court protected this group and its rights through rational basis
with bite.
In Cleburne, the Court invalidated a Texas city's decision to deny a special
use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded,
under an ordinance requiring permits for such homes.'37 The Court of Ap-
peals had invalidated the decision under heightened scrutiny, determining
mental retardation to be a quasi-suspect classification. 38 While the Supreme
Court affirmed the outcome, it concluded that the Court of Appeals had
erred in finding a quasi-suspect classification. 19 The Supreme Court rec-
ognized that states have a legitimate interest in regulating the retarded because
they have a "reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday
world."'14 The Court added that the legislature is better equipped than the
judiciary for this task.' 4' The Court also thought heightened scrutiny might
chill legislative action designed to protect or favor the retarded. 42 The Court
next argued that the mentally retarded were not actually politically powerless
because they had the "ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers."' 43
Finally, the Court reasoned that recognizing the retarded as quasi:suspect
135. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); See also Stewart, supra note 9, at 110-15; Summary, Analysis,
and Commentary, supra note 9, at 242-43.
136. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252-53. See also supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
137. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252.
138. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
139. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255-56.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 3256.
142. Id. at 3257.
143. Id.
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would require recognizing all groups as quasi-suspect if they have immutable
disabilities, cannot mandate legislative outcomes, and can claim some degree
of prejudice from the public. 44 Thus, the Court was reluctant to invoke
heightened scrutiny by finding another suspect classification.
The Court instead purported to apply the rational basis test to the chal-
lenged ordinance. It articulated the rational basis test, but then, as if to
signal what was to come, it-cited Zobel as the basis for this test.145 Once
again, the ensuing review was more exacting than the traditional rational
basis test.
First, the Court carefully examined the city's purported justifications for
its decision: (1) the negative attitude of the neighbors; (2) the facility's
location on a five hundred year flood plain and its nearness to a junior high
school whose students might harass retarded persons; and (3) the city's
concern over the size of the home and the number of proposed occupants.'"6
The Court found concern over the negative attitudes of neighbors to be an
illegitimate purpose for denying the permit. 47 The Court next found that
denying the permit for the group home was not rationally-related to the
justifications concerning location because retarded students attended the
school and the city permitted other homes, such as convalescent homes, on
the flood plain. 4 Finally, the Court found that the city never justified its
view that the home would be over-crowded. 49 In the end, the Court not
only refused to accept the city's purposes, it further claimed that the city's
decision unfairly singled out the retarded to bear the burden of these concerns
and therefore must have been motivated by "irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded."' 150 For these reasons, the ordinance violated the equal
protection clause.15 '
The Cleburne dissent is correct when it argues that the "ordinance surely
would be valid under the traditional rational basis test.' 52 Under the tra-
ditional test, the Court would let the city single out the group home before
convalescent homes in meeting its concern about the flood plain, because
the legislature may take "one step at a time."' 53 Furthermore, the Court
would not put the burden on the city to convince the Court that the home
would be overcrowded because, under the traditional test, the legislation is
144. Id. at 3257-58.
145. Id. at 3258.
146. Id. at 3258-60.
147. Id. at 3259.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 3260.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
153.. Id. at 3264 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See supra notes 41-
53 and accompanying text.
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presumptively constitutional. 154 Finally, the Court would not subject the
legislature's justifications to such detailed review.5 5 Since the Court did not
analyze the ordinance in the same manner that the dissent did, it must have
employed a more exacting form of scrutiny than the rational basis test.
Justice Marshall suggests in his concurrence that the Court actually em-
ployed intermediate level scrutiny.1 56 This claim is surprising since the ma-
jority opinion evidences a conscious desire to avoid heightened scrutiny and
instead apply rational basis. For example, because the city's decision failed
under the rational basis test, the Court arguably did not have to rule on
whether mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification. 57 Yet the Court
went to great extremes to prove that mental retardation was not even quasi-
suspect in order to avoid intermediate level scrutiny.'58 First, the Court
rejected application of the Plyler rationale for this case, even though Cleburne
is quite similar to Plyler, 59 even though the Court cited Plyler for its
understanding of the fourteenth amendment,' 6° and even though, as the
dissent pointed out, mental retardation is a good candidate for quasi-suspect
classification.' 6' Second, the Court advanced an argument against heightened
scrutiny in any context in which social or economic legislation is challenged
by other groups like the retarded; such as, the mentally ill, disabled, elderly
or infirm. 62 Third, the Court argued that the appropriate method of resolving
cases of discrimination like that in Cleburne is not to create a new quasi-
suspect classification. 63
Even though the Court claimed that it could not apply intermediate level
scrutiny, the Court strongly implied that something more than the rational
basis test was needed to combat discrimination like that in Cleburne. First,
the Court argued that it should look at whether governmental action premised
on a particular classification is valid as a general matter; 1 4 meaning that
the Court would take a closer look at the proffered justifications. Second,
154. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See
also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
155. Detailed review of justifications is more appropriate for intermediate level scrutiny.
Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3264 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also
supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
156. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 3263-64.
158. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
160. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3254.
161. The dissent argued that mental retardation is a good candidate for quasi-suspect clas-
sification because the retarded have a long history of purposeful unequal treatment and the
increasing sensitivity of the legislature to their plight does not make them more politically
powerful. Id. at 3268-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
162. See id. at 3257-58; Summary, Analysis, and Commentary, supra note 11, at 243; supra
note 144 and accompanying text.
163. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
164. Id.
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the Court defined the rational basis test and expressed the need to defer to
the legislature. Yet the Court went on to limit legislative power by stressing
that the classification cannot be irrational and cited ZobeP65 -a case that
involved more probing scrutiny than traditional rational basis review.'6
Finally, the Court held the ordinace invalid under less-than-deferential re-
view. If the Court's opinion is viewed in light of what the Court actually
did-not what it said it did-then Justice Marshall was correct in arguing
that the Court had essentially employed intermediate scrutiny.
The Court's decision to use a more exacting scrutiny than traditional
rational basis in the Cleburne case has merit for the same reasons as when
the Court used intermediate level scrutiny in Plyer. In Cleburne, as in Plyer,
the Court was faced with both a politically-disadvantaged group and an
important right asserted by that group. As Justice Marshall argued in his
concurrence, the mentally retarded have a long history of subjection to
purposeful discrimination and the increasing sensitivity of the legislature to
their plight does not make them more politically-powerful. 6 7 Therefore, the
mentally-retarded might need the special protection of heightened scrutiny.
Moreover, as Justice Marshall argued, the "right to 'establish a home' has
long been cherished as one of the fundamental liberties .... ,,168 Therefore,
this right is too important to justify complete deferral to state legislatures.
Because the Cleburne ordinance was within the Ply/er context-that is, it
affected both a group at least approaching quasi-suspect status and an
important right-the Court is justified in employing something more probing
than traditional rational basis.
C. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward: Rational Basis with
Bite in the Economic Context
The Supreme Court's most questionable use of rational basis with bite,
during the 1985 term, occurred in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward6 9
in which the Court used the rational basis test to invalidate economic leg-
islation. The Court concluded in a narrow 5-4 decision that an Alabama
statute that taxed out-of-state (foreign) insurance companies on gross pre-
miums more heavily than Alabama-based (domestic) insurers did not satisfy
the rational basis test.17 0 This case is unusual for two reasons. First,. the
Supreme Court normally deals with situations of this nature under the
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
167. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3268-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Even with increased legislative sensitivity, the mentally retarded are still disadvantaged in the
political process because they do not vote or hold office.
168. Id. at 3266.
169. 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985).
170. Id. at 1684.
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commerce clause.171 The commerce clause prevents states from burdening
interstate commerce, unless Congress legislates that the states may freely
regulate some aspect of interstate commerce.1 72 The "dormant" commerce
clause, therefore, generally protects businesses from state taxation schemes
which discriminate against interstate commerce. 173 With the McCarren-Fer-
guson Act, Congress removed this protection from insurers by giving the
states power to regulate and tax the insurance industry. 74 Because Congress
had removed commerce clause protection from the insurance industry, the
Court should have upheld the tax in Metropolitan Life. 75 Further, the Court
rarely invalidates tax statutes of this nature under the equal protection clause.
Until recently, the Court did not recognize foreign insurers as "persons"
within the protection of the equal protection clause. 76 When the Court finally
did invoke the equal protection clause for foreign insurers, it was completely
deferential to the legislature. 7 7 Based on precedent, therefore, the Court
should not have used the equal protection clause to invalidate the tax in
Metropolitan Life. Yet the Court not only refused to uphold the tax with
commerce clause theory, it invalidated the tax under the equal protection
clause. This decision suggests the Court might intend to use rational basis
with bite in the economic context.
In Metropolitan Life, the Court scarcely entertained the argument that
Congressional legislation existed that gave the state the right to exclude
foreign corporations from conducting business within its boundaries. Instead,
it went directly to the equal protection clause argument, and it purported
to apply the rational basis test to the Alabama tax scheme. 7 The Court
argued that state authority to exclude foreign companies from doing business
within its borders did not by itself justify imposing a greater tax burden on
foreign companies, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic
companies had "a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose."' 179 Once
171. The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have power ... to regulate com-
merce ... among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
172. Western & Southern Life Ins. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981).
173. Hellerstein & Leegstra, Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Strikes Down Discriminatory
State Insurance Tax, 63 J. TAX'N 108 (1985).
174. McCarren-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15.
175. Hellerstein & Leegstra, supra note 173, at 108; Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1694
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. Hellerstein & Leegstra, supra note 173, at 108; WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S.
117 (1968). Prior to WHYY, the Court avoided using the equal protection clause by holding
that a corporation is not a person within a state's jurisdiction unless it complies with all
conditions that the state places upon its entry in the state. Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at
660. In WHYY, the Court held that, even though the "State may impose conditions on the
entry of foreign corporations to do business in the State, once it has permitted them to enter,
'the adopted corporations are entitled to equal potection' with the State's own corporate progeny
." WHYY, 393 U.S. at 119-20 (emphasis in the original).
177. See, e.g., Western & Southern, 451 U.S. 648.
178. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1680.
179. Id.
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again, however, the ensuing review was much more exacting than traditional
rational basis review.
The Court first rejected Alabama's purpose of encouraging the formation
of Alabama-based insurance companies. 8 0 The Court reasoned that erecting
barriers to foreign competition for the sole purpose of improving domestic
insurers' ability to compete constituted "the very sort of parochial discrim-
ination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. '"', The
Court also found that the purpose of encouraging capital investment in
Alabama "in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state
purpose."' 8 2 The Court thought that, because domestic insurers remained
entitled to the favorable tax rate, and because foreign insurers could never
make up the difference, the scheme would discourage foreign investment.'
Because neither justification was legitimate, the Alabama statute failed under
the rational basis test.
Justice O'Connor was correct, however, to argue in her dissent that "prec-
edents demand" that the Court sustain the Alabama tax under the rational
basis test.'84 First, as Justice O'Connor argued, the traditional rational basis
test imposes "a heavy burden on those who challenge local economic
regulation" ' 5 -not on the legislature-since the legislation is presumptively
constitutional.8 6 She accused the Court of "melding the proper two-step
inquiry regarding the State's purpose into a single unarticulated judgment:"'s7
she thought the Court found a perfectly legitimate goal to be improper
simply because the Court disagreed with the discriminatory, yet rational,
means of differential taxation.' Second, as is characteristic of traditional
rational basis review, Justice O'Connor herself proffered several state in-
terests justifying the legislation.8 9 In particular, she insisted that encouraging
the formation of Alabama-based insurance companies was legitimate because
foreign insurance companies *are likely to neglect rural and lower-income
customers.190
The dissent correctly described the Court's analysis in Metropolitan Life
as "miserly"191 since the statute should have passed minimal scrutiny. Because
the Court used rational basis with bite to review a statute involving differ-
ential taxation which is normally analyzed under the dormant commerce
180. Id. at 1684.
181. Id. at 1681-82.
182. Id. at 1684.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1692 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1685 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
186. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
187. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1685 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
190. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1686-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 1686 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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clause, the Metropolitan Life case may indicate the beginning of a juris-
prudence of rational basis with bite in the economic context. Such a trend,
however, seems unlikely.
On the one hand, the Supreme Court cannot justify reviewing statutes
like the one in Metropolitan Life with scrutiny more exacting than traditional
rational basis review. First, as the four dissenting justices in Metropolitan
Life argued, the decision is a threat to the federal government because it
usurps the power of Congress to invoke the commerce clause or let it lie
dormant. 192 The dissent reasoned that the commerce clause should remain
Congress' "flexible tool of economic policy," and that the judiciary should
not interfere unless Congress is truly invidious and irrational in its use of
this tool. 193 This criticism of the Metropolitan Life opinion is a good reason
for the Court to refrain in the future from applying anything more searching
than rational basis review in the economic context.
Second, Metropolitan Life does not contain the elements which justified
rational basis with bite in the other cases. Unlike the right-to-travel cases
and Cleburne, the statute in Metropolitan Life does not burden an important
right. 194 Unlike the right-to-travel cases and Cleburne, the statute does not
burden a class whose members are losers in the political process 95 within
the meaning of the Carolene Products footnote.'9 Businesses have ample
protection from government action. First, foreign businesses, or any business
against which economic legislation might discriminate, can always look to
the commerce clause for protection, unless Congress removes this protection
in particular situations. Second, businesses do have political influence through
businessmen's votes and especially through political lobby organizations.
Because statutes like the one in Metropolitan Life affect neither a group at
least approaching quasi-suspect status nor an important right, a higher scru-
tiny is difficult to justify. The wiser course for the Court to follow, therefore,
is to continue use of only the traditional rational basis test for economic
legislation.
The Supreme Court's recent actiong indicate that it will most likely follow
the wiser course. The Court decided Metropolitan Life by a narrow margin.
Then, less than three months after the Metropolitan Life decision, the Court
confronted a similar situation in another case, Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,' 97 and unanimously
refused to find an equal protection violation."' In Northeast Bancorp, two
192. Id. at 1693-94.
193. Id.
194. See supra Part IL A-B.
195. See id.
196. See supra notes 20-23.
197. 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
198. Id. at 2556.
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congressional acts specifically authorized regional protectionism in the bank-
ing industry.' 99 The Court upheld Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes
that permitted foreign banks to acquire in-state banks only if the foreign
banks' home-states accorded reciprocal privileges to Massachusetts and Con-
necticut banking organizations.20 Justice O'Connor argued in her concur-
rence that the Northeast Bancorp statute, like the Metropolitan Life statute,
clearly favored domestic business over foreign business and therefore saw
the Court's refusal to find an equal protection challenge in Northeast Bancorp
as properly limiting the importance of Metropolitan Life.20 1 The Court,
therefore, will most likely continue to apply only traditional rational basis
review in the economic context.
III. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY BY ANY OTHER NAME
The Supreme Court's decisions in Zobel, Williams, Hooper, Cleburne and
Metropolitan Life suggest that the Court is now willing to employ a searching
scrutiny under the guise of traditional rational basis review; that is, to employ
rational basis with bite. In each of these cases, the Court purported to apply
the rational basis test, and yet it invalidated legislation which it certainly
would have upheld under traditional analysis. Whether this is an actual trend
remains unclear because the Court has employed rational basis with bite but
five times and failed to be candid about its actions each time. For instance,
in the right-to-travel context, the Court has employed rational basis with
bite three times. In a "Plyler" context, however, the Court has only employed
it once. In the economic context, the Court has also employed rational basis
with bite once. But when a second opportunity to employ rational basis with
bite arose in the economic context, the Court employed traditional rational
basis review. 202 In each of these cases, moreover, the Court neither expressly
stated that it was using rational basis with bite nor delineated the situations
justifying this higher level of scrutiny.
In substance, the Court's doctrine is justifiable in the right-to-travel and
"Plyler" contexts. For example, both the right-to-travel cases and Cleburne
involved legislation which burdened an important right of a group at least
approaching.,quasi-suspect status.2 3 Therefore, the same elements exist in
these contexts which justified the added protection of higher scrutiny in
Plyler.204 As the Metropolitan Life case evidenced, however, rational basis
with bite in a purely economic context is difficult to justify. The statutes in
199. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 3(d), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1980).
200. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2548-49, 2556.
201. Id. at 2556-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. See supra Part II.
203. See supra note 135 and accompanying text; notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
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this context do not burden an important right or a politically-powerless class.
Instead, the burdened class can influence the political process or look to the
commerce clause for protection.2 5 Therefore, in an economic context, the
Court cannot explain the need for a higher level of judicial suspicion.
In truth, the analysis applied under the guise of traditional rational basis
review in Zobel, Williams, Hooper, Cleburne and Metropolitan Life is noth-
ing more than a camouflaged version of "Plyler" intermediate scrutiny. In
these opinions, the Court did not articulate the intermediate scrutiny test.
The Court, however, seems to have actually required that the legislative
classification be "substantially related" to the achievement of "important
governmental objectives."20 For example, the Court did not presume the
legislation to be constitutional, as it would under traditional rational basis
review: it refused to supplant the state's goal with goals it considered legit-
imate, and it would not permit under- and over-inclusiveness. Instead, the
Court looked more closely at the relationship of the classification to achieving
the state's goal: it did not accept every goal proffered by the state; and if
an alternative means existed which did not disadvantage the protected group,
the Court invalidated the legislation.2 8 This analysis is exactly the type of
analysis which occurs under intermediate scrutiny. 209
The triggering mechanism for both types of review is also arguably the
same. Rational basis with bite, as argued earlier, is only justified in substance
for the same reason that intermediate scrutiny is justified; that is, if it is
used to review legislation that burdens an important right of a group at
least approaching quasi-suspect status. It appears that the same two elements
that often trigger intermediate scrutiny also trigger rational basis with bite.
The only difference between the two tests, therefore, is that the Court
candidly explains what triggered heightened scrutiny under the label "inter-
mediate scrutiny" and it does not under the label "rational basis".
In Zobel, Williams, Hooper, Cleburne and Metropolitan Life, the Court
has in effect applied intermediate scrutiny without articulating the factors
that triggered it. Rational, basis with bite, therefore, creates a limitless op-
portunity for the court to closely scrutinize legislation whenever it sees fit.
This unbridled freedom has many potential negative effects. Among them,
it fosters lower court confusion as to what version of the rational basis test
to apply in any given case. On the one hand, the lower courts may simply
employ deferential review in all cases, including those in which the legislation
burdens the important right of a group at least approaching quasi-suspect
status. This reaction, unfortunately, would leave unprotected some politi-
205. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Part II.
209. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
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cally-disadvantaged groups and important rights which may justify judicial
protection. On the other hand, lower courts may conduct searching scrutiny
of all legislation, including economic legislation in which heightened scrutiny
cannot be justified. This lower court action would be a "regrettable step
back toward the days of Lochner,'"210 during which the courts conducted
searching reviews of economic legislation. This "step backwards" would
once again permit justices to engraft their own values onto the equal pro-
tection clause. Justices, including those on the Supreme Court, could sit as
a Superlegislature, usurping legislative power at a great cost to the major-
itarian process. Legislatures, as a result, will have little basis for determining
when and how they may classify in order to achieve their objectives. In light
of these ramifications, rational basis with bite is indefensible. In the future,
the Supreme Court should candidly state when and why it is using inter-
mediate scrutiny, instead of calling it by any other name.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decisions strongly suggest that it is willing to
employ searching scrutiny under the label of rational basis review. In other
words, it is willing to employ rational basis with bite. Rational basis with
bite, however, is merely intermediate scrutiny by another name. Both stand-
ards of review require a probing scrutiny which is apparently triggered by
the existence of legislation that burdens the important right of a group which
at least approaches a quasi-suspect status. The two standards only differ
because the Court does not explain which factors trigger heightened scrutiny
under the label "rational basis" as it does under the label "intermediate
scrutiny."
Rational basis with bite, therefore, creates an endless opportunity for the
Court to closely scrutinize legislation whenever it sees fit. This unbridled
freedom fosters confusion in lower courts as to what version of the rational
basis test to apply in any given case. At one extreme, the lower courts may
only apply deferential review, leaving unprotected some groups and rights
210. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3265 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Justice
O'Connor also hearkens back to Lochner in Metropolitan Life by quoting Justice Holmes'
dissent from that ruling. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. at 1676, 1693 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The case of Lochner v. New York began a period in which the
Court reviewed economic legislation with probing scrutiny. Critics attacked these decisions as
fostering the Court's own economic views of constitutional provisions instead of deferring to
the state legislatures which better represent the views of the people. For example, Justice Holmes
admonished courts "not to extend prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into
them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain." Tyson
& Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., the Court dealt the final blow to the Lochner era by adopting the deferential
rational basis test for reviewing economic legislation. Williamson, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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which may deserve judicial protection. At the other extreme, they may only
apply searching review, usurping legislative power at a great cost to the the
majoritarian process. At either extreme, legislatures cannot possibly know
when and how they may classify to achieve their goals. In light of this
effect, rational basis with bite is clearly an undesirable standard of review.
The wiser course for the Court would be to candidly state when and why
it is using intermediate scrutiny, instead of camouflaging it with another
name.
GAYLE LYNN PETINGA

